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Abstract
A State-Based Proactive Approach to Network Isolation Verification
in Clouds
Gagandeep Singh Chawla
The multi-tenancy nature of public clouds usually leads to cloud tenants’ concerns
over network isolation around their virtual resources. Verifying network isolation in
clouds faces unique challenges. The sheer size of virtual infrastructures paired with
the self-serviced nature of clouds means the verification will likely have a high com-
plexity and yet its results may become obsolete in seconds. Moreover, the fine-grained
and distributed network access control (e.g., per-VM security group rules) typical to
virtual cloud infrastructures means the verification must examine not only the events
but also the current state of the infrastructures. In this thesis, we propose VMGuard,
a state-based proactive approach for efficiently verifying large-scale virtual infras-
tructures against network isolation policies. Informally, our key idea is to proactively
trigger the verification based on predicted events and their simulated impact upon
the current state, such that we can have the best of both worlds, i.e., the efficiency of
a proactive approach and the effectiveness of state-based verification. We implement
and evaluate VMGuard based on OpenStack, and our experiments with both real and
synthetic data demonstrate the performance and efficiency.
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Security and privacy issues, such as the lack of transparency, accountability and
auditability, remain as the main concerns for individuals and enterprises to fully in-
tegrate their workflow into clouds [1, 16, 74]. In particular, the multi-tenancy nature
of public clouds means cloud tenants would likely keep worrying about the lack of
sufficient network isolation around their virtual resources. Recent studies show that
almost 70% of cloud users consider security as a major issue in clouds, of which 80%
agree that network isolation is the biggest obstacle to adopting clouds [2, 63]. Cloud
providers often have an obligation to provide clear evidences for sufficient network
isolation [4], either as part of the service level agreements, or to demonstrate com-
pliance with security standards (e.g., ISO 27002/27017 [26, 27] and CCM 3.0.1 [15]).
Moreover, cloud providers may gain a competitive edge in today’s highly competitive
market by providing the capability of verifying network isolation as a security service
to their tenants.
However, in contrast to traditional network environments, the virtual infrastruc-
tures hosted in clouds pose unique challenges to network isolation verification.
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– First, the sheer size of cloud means different network configurations may be
constantly introduced by multiple tenants which can easily lead to an isola-
tion breach. For example, a descent size cloud contains a few hundred tenants
running thousands of virtual machines deployed in a cloud data center [55].
The tools verifying isolation within traditional networks [24, 23, 73, 22] cannot
work with virtual infrastructures. Tools designed for clouds, such as NOD [36],
takes hours to detect a breach within a data center. Contrary to which, Ten-
antGuard [69] generates reachability for a data center within seconds. Yet
compliance verification to detect an isolation breach is off-line process in [69].
– Second, the self-service nature of a cloud multiplexes the operational complex-
ity with the number of tenants in an environment where any tenant triggered
operation may invalidate existing verification results. The dynamical nature
of cloud calls for proactive solutions such as LeaPS, PVSC [41, 40], that pre-
computes for a critical event in advance for minimum delay to verification at
run-time. But these approaches use signatures based prevention which makes
them limited only to the known vulnerabilities in cloud platform.
The sheer size of such virtual infrastructures paired with their self-serviced and
highly dynamic nature means most verification techniques designed for traditional
networks would cause so much delays that their results may become obsolete before
they are ready (a more detailed review of related work will be given in Chapter 6). To
that end, TenantGuard [69] and LeaPS [41] are two promising solutions specifically
designed for clouds, as demonstrated in the following.
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1.1 Motivating Example
Figure 1 employs a sequence of administrative events (upper-left) inside a simplified
virtual infrastructure (upper-right) to demonstrate the limitations of existing works
and our key ideas (lower). Suppose a user Bob wants to forbid all the ingress traffic
from subnet SNA1 to his billing server (IP: 10.1.1.7) by deleting its security group
rule [52]. However, he is not aware of an OpenStack vulnerability OSSA-2015-021 [51],
which causes the change of security group to fail silently on already running VMs.
At a later time, another user Alice creates her own VM (10.1.5.9) and connects it to
subnet SNA1. At this time, the network isolation has been compromised since Alice
































































Figure 1: The motivating example
– In such a case, TenantGuard [69] could generate all-pair reachability results
within seconds by examining the state of the virtual infrastructure. However,
TenantGuard by itself does not support verification against isolation policies
(e.g., no ingress traffic from subnet SNA1 to Bob’s billing server), and applying
an additional verification tool on top of the all-pair reachability results may
again introduce a significant delay (e.g., Congress [53] may take minutes to
3
hours for large clouds based on our evaluation).
– As a promising solution, LeaPS [41] would predict event EK as soon as it sees
EK−1 (since the next thing to do after creating a VM is typically attaching it to
a subnet), and consequently start the verification for EK long before it actually
arrives. However, since we assume the vulnerability is not known, the first halve
of this undesired reachability (from Bob’s billing server to SNA1) can only be
detected by examining the state of the virtual infrastructure. Therefore, with-
out looking at the state, the event-based verification in LeaPS [41] will consider
EK as normal and miss the isolation breach.
This example shows that the state-based approach and the proactive approach
both have their advantages and drawbacks. A natural question is: Can we design a
state-based, and proactive approach, such that we can have the best of both worlds?
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we present VMGuard as an answer to the aforementioned question, as
demonstrated at the bottom of Figure 1. We tackle several unique challenges in de-
signing VMGuard. Specifically, the state-based verification only works after an event
has actually occurred (with its effect on the state materialized). However, since each
event can lead to multiple predicted next events with different effects on the current
state, how to verify those predicted events without adversely affecting the true state
of the virtual infrastructure (since predicted events may never happen) becomes a
major challenge. We will tackle this and other challenges in the remainder of this
thesis.
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Our main contributions in this work are as follows:
– To the best of our knowledge, VMGuard is the first state-based proactive ap-
proach to network isolation verification that excels in both effectiveness and
efficiency in comparison to existing methods.
– We implement VMGuard based on OpenStack [52] and evaluate its performance
through experiments with both real and synthetic data. Our results confirm the
superior performance of VMGuard.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers necessary
background on both the state-of-art approaches. In Chapter 3, we first illustrate the
main challenges for this work and dive into methodology. The implementation and
experimentation details of VMGuard are elaborated in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 include
discussion over features of VMGuard, its portability to different cloud platforms and
application to NFV environment. Chapter 6 compare VMGuard with related works.
Chapter 7 briefly introduces other contributions made during period of this thesis.




This chapter provides necessary background on two state-of-the-art verification ap-
proaches to facilitate further discussions and then defines the threat model.
2.1 State-Based Verification
As a state-based (the state here refers to the collection of all reachability information
inside the virtual infrastructure) verification tool, TenantGuard [69] can efficiently
verify all-pair VM-level reachability for large clouds (e.g., 13 seconds for 168 millions
of VM pairs) with its hierarchical approach, as demonstrated in Figure 2 and detailed
below.
• In [Step 1], TenantGuard checks the subnet-to-subnet reachability within the
same network (using the private IPs), e.g., between SNA1 and SNA2.
• In [Step 2], TenantGuard verifies the subnet-to-subnet reachability involving
external networks (using the public IPs), e.g., between SNA1 and SNA3.
• In [Step 3], TenantGuard only needs to check VM-level reachability (mainly

















Figure 2: Examples of the state-based verification by TenantGuard [69]
the first two steps, leading to significant cost savings.
We will leverage TenantGuard in a proactive fashion in Chapter 3.
2.2 Proactive Verification
As a proactive verification tool, LeaPS [41] initiates the verification before an event
actually arrives, leading to millisecond-level response time. This is possible due to
the so-called dependency model, which captures the likelihood of next events (either
by design, or extracted as frequent patterns from historical events), as demonstrated
in Figure 3 and detailed below.
• When a create VM event occurs, LeaPS identifies a highly probable next event,
attach port, from the dependency model.
• LeaPS verifies this predicted event (attach port) based on a pre-defined signature









































Figure 3: Examples of the proactive verification by LeaPS [41]
on another tenant’s VM under vulnerability OSSA 2014-008 [56]), and if this
event causes no breach then its parameters (e.g., VM ID: 2134 ) will be added
to the watchlist (which is essentially a tenant-specific white list).
• Later, when an attach port event actually occurs, all LeaPS needs to do is to
search for its parameter (e.g., VM ID) in the watchlist (a match means the
event will be allowed), resulting in a negligible delay.
We will enhance LeaPS with state-based verification in Chapter 3.
2.3 Threat Model
The in-scope threats include any implementation flaws, misconfigurations, and vul-
nerabilities in the cloud platform that may be exploited by malicious cloud users to
violate the network isolation policies specified by cloud tenants or the provider. Since
our solution is based on the system state instead of the events, such threats are in the
scope even if they are previously unknown, as long as their effect on network isolation
is visible in the state of the virtual infrastructure. On the other hand, we focus on the
8
virtual network management layer in the cloud and only consider network isolation-
related security policies. We also assume the cloud platform may be trusted for the
correctness of the inputs (e.g., logs and configuration database). Any security breach
that is not reflected in such inputs (either due to the nature of such breaches, such
as side-channel attacks, or due to inputs tempered by attackers) is out of the scope,




In this chapter, we first show the main challenges and provide an overview before
delving into the details of our methodology.
3.1 Challenges
We first show the challenges in designing a state-based proactive verification ap-
proach, by discussing why the integration between the state-based TenantGuard [69]
(see Section 2.1) and the proactive LeaPS [41] (see Section 2.2) will not be straight-
forward, as illustrated in Figure 4. In [Step 1], upon the occurrence of event Ek−1
(create VM ), we follow the LeaPS approach to predict the next event to be attach
port based on the dependency model. In [Step 2], we obtain the updated state of
the virtual infrastructure based on the effect of this predicted event. In [Step 3],
we apply TenantGuard to the updated state to obtain the reachability result. In this
case, since there is an isolation breach, the predicted event will not be added to the


















































Figure 4: Challenges in designing a state-based proactive verification approach
However, the above description has omitted some major challenges. Specifically,
unlike the event-based LeaPS, the state-based TenantGuard only works on the resul-
tant state of an event (i.e., the collection of all the reachability information with the
effect of that event taken into consideration). Obtaining such a state for an event
that is only predicted, but has not actually occurred, poses a series of challenges as
follows.
• First, the dependency model can only predict the type of events (e.g., attach
port) but not their detailed parameters (e.g., to which subnet) [41]. However,
we cannot obtain the resultant state of an event without its parameters.
• Second, even if we could predict the event parameters (e.g., attach port to
either subnet SNA1, SNA2, or SNA3), obtaining the resultant state for those
events would still be a challenge. We cannot directly apply such events to the
virtual infrastructure, since the predicted events may never occur, while their
effects may be irrevocable (e.g., information leakage or denial of service as the




















































































































Figure 5: An overview of VMGuard
• Third, while a viable solution is to emulate the effect of predicted events on
a new copy of the current state, creating such a copy may lead to prohibitive
computational and storage overhead in clouds. To make things worse, an event
may lead to multiple predicted events with different and incompatible effects
on the state (e.g., P1 and P3 lead to breaches but P2 does not) which requires
creating multiple independent copies of the state.
3.2 Overview
To address the aforementioned challenges, we design our state-based proactive ap-
proach, namely, VMGuard. Figure 5 shows an overview of VMGuard with three
main modules, proactive verification, incremental verification, and pruning.
• First, the proactive verification module performs pre-computation and proactive
verification. In the pre-computation phase, all the predicted next events will be
instantiated with potential parameters based on the current state of the virtual
infrastructure.






























Figure 6: Applying VMGuard on the running example
each of which is used to evaluate the impact of one instantiated event. Each
copy of the state is flushed immediately once the verification is done; only the
compliant results are stored in a watchlist.
• Third, to minimize the overhead of incremental verification, the pruning module
further limits the scope of the verification to the intersection between the set of
VMs involved in the policies and the set of VMs that may be impacted by the
instantiated event.
• Finally, when the actual event arrives, the proactive verification module matches
it against the watchlist and the incremental verification module merges its effect




Each received event will trigger the pre-computation to identify potential next events
based on the dependency model described in Section 2.2. Any event exceeding the pre-
defined threshold becomes a candidate for pre-computation. A candidate event gets
instantiated based on all possible parameters, as demonstrated through an example
based on OpenStack [52] in Table 1. To illustrate this, Figure 6 shows how VMGuard
works on our running example; the upper part of the figure is the timeline for incoming
events and the actions taken by VMGuard, and the lower part of the figure shows the
dependency model (left), the network state (center), and the watchlist for the event
EN (right).
Event Parameters # of Predicted Parameters
Attach Interface Router ID and subnet ID* #Routers × #Subnets
Attach Port VM ID and subnet ID #Subnets
Attach Public IP VM ID and unallocated public IP #VMs × #unallocated public IP
Delete Router Router ID #Routers
Detach Interface Router interfaces ID #Router Interfaces
Detach Port VM port ID #Port
Detach Public IP Allocated public IP #Allocated public IPs
Detach Security Group Rule Security Group ID #Security group rules
* Exception: A router should not have any overlapping subnets
Table 1: Examples of reachability-related events, their parameters to be instantiated,
and the number of possible instantiations
Example 1
From the sequence of events in Figure 6, event EK−1 creates a VM (ID: 2134 ).
According to the dependency model, the next event could be Delete VM or Attach
port. Assume the threshold is 0.5 in all our examples. The pre-computation module
selects Attach port as the next event to be evaluated in advance. As shown in Table 1,
to instantiate this event, both VM ID and subnet ID are the required parameters.
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The event generator generates three possible events based on the current network
state: “Post create 2134, SNA1”, “Post create 2134, SNA2”, and “Post create 2134,
SNA3”.
3.3.2 Proactive verification
Two possible scenarios may happen for proactive verification, i.e., the actual event
may either occur before, or after the pre-computation process finishes. In the first
case, VMGuard will switch to the intercept-check mode, which only verifies the inter-
cepted event, e.g., attach port verification in Figure 6 (some other situations, e.g., a
mistakenly predicted event, will also trigger the intercept-check mode). In the second
case, VMGuard will trigger proactive verification which searches for the event in the
watchlist, e.g., delete router verification. In either case, the watchlist is flushed, as it
is no longer valid with the state of cloud. The verification process will be detailed in
Section 3.4, and for now it can be regarded as a black-box.
Example 2
The next event for attach port is “EN : delete router”. After instantiating the event
with the three available routers, RA1, RA2, and RA3, VMGuard triggers the incre-
mental verification. The results of the verification are added to a watchlist, shown in
Figuer 6 (lower right). Assume the network isolation policy says “VME1 allows all
ingress traffic from the external network”, which means Eve’s VM under RA2 must
be reachable to the external network. Then, “Delete router RA2” is a non-compliant
event and will be removed from the watchlist, whereas “Delete router RA3” is com-
pliant and will be kept in the watchlist and allowed later when it occurs.
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3.4 Incremental Verification
As we discussed in Section 3.1, emulating the effect of multiple predicted events
requires creating copies of the state of the virtual infrastructure. For this purpose, we
propose the Fork and Merge procedures in the VMGuard incremental verification
module.
3.4.1 Fork
During the fork procedure, each instantiated event will be associated with an indepen-
dent copy of the current state of the virtual infrastructure. To maintain the scalability
of this solution, we will leverage the pruning module (detailed in Section 3.5) to limit
the scope of verification and we will further evaluate the overhead of the fork pro-
cedure through experiments in Chapter 4.2. Once the instantiated event is applied
to a copy of the state and the pruning module has been applied, we will employ the
resultant state to verify the reachability against the given isolation policy, and then
delete that copy of the state as soon as the verification completes. In this way, we
do not incur the additional storage overhead for maintaining multiple copies of the
state, and only the compliant results will be stored in the watchlist for proactive
verification. The actual state of the virtual infrastructure remains intact until the
merge procedure is triggered.
3.4.2 Merge
The merge procedure will be triggered when a compliant event is actually received.
It will update the actual state of the virtual infrastructure based on the effect of this
event.
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Algorithm 1: Incremental Verification
Input: Event, RadixTries, PrunedList, ReachabilityRelatedEvents
Output: result∈{Compliant, Non-Compliant}
1 Copy RadixTries to RadixTriesFork
2 if event ∈ ReachabilityRelatedEvents then
3 Update RadixTriesFork with event
4 for VMdst ∈ PrunedList do
5 for VMsrc ∈ PrunedList do
6 Triepub ← getBTrie(VMdst.publicIP.CIDR,VMsrc.subnet id)
7 Triepriv ← getBtrie(VMdst.private.CIDR, rounter id)
8 routable ← Route-Lookup(Triepub,TriePriv)
9 if routable is true then
10 if VerifyPolicy(VMsrc,VMdst) is true then
11 result ← Compliant
12 else
13 result ← Non-Compliant
14 break
15 return result
Input: event response, Radixtries
16 if event response is success then
17 Update RadixTries with event
In Algorithm 1, lines 10-15 present the fork procedure. It takes an event, the
current radix tries (the data structure used in TenantGuard to store the state of the
virtual infrastructure [69]), the prunedList (this list will be generated in Algorithm 2
in Section 3.5) and ReachabilityRelatedEvents (See Table 1 as an example). Lines
1-3 in the algorithm generate a copy of the state for a reachability event and apply
the event to the state. Lines 4-5 take the pair of VMs from the prunedlist, then
lines 6-8 evaluate the reachability between two VM pairs (getBtrie, getBtrie, and
Rounte-lookup are the VM-level isolation verification functions from TenantGuard).
Function VerifyPolicy checks whether the reachability between VMsrc and VMdst
is allowed. Then lines 9-14 generate compliance results by comparing the policy
to the reachability results of TenantGuard. If a non-compliant result is found, this
instantiated event is marked as non-compliant. Lines 16-17 show the merge procedure
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only update the state when the event response is success.
Example 3
In Figure 6, EK−1 triggers proactive verification for event EK . The fork procedure
emulates the impacts of three events on three independent copies of the state. How-
ever, since the actual event “attach port SNA1” occurs before the pre-computation
phase completes, the verification against other copies gets flushed immediately; the
verification happens only on the copy of state with the actual event. TenantGuard
will identify the new reachability in the copied state between the newly created VM
(ID: 2134 ) and Bob’s VM. Assume the policy is “VMBob,*, Deny” (i.e., denying
all ingress traffic to this VM), which means this actual event is non-compliant and
therefore, will be blocked by VMGuard.
3.5 Pruning
To improve the scalability of our incremental verification, we present the pruning
module in this section. The main purpose of this module is to reduce the number
of VMs for incremental verification. Only the compliant results corresponding to the
pruned list of VMs are stored in a watchlist to wait for the actual event.
In Algorithm 2 (pruning procedure), lines 1-3 list the VMs that have at least
one policy associated with the input event’s tenant ID. If the list is not empty, lines
4-11 also list the VMs that might be affected by the input event by comparing the
attributes of the events, e.g., the type and the parameters of the event. In the end, a
pruned list is generated with the intersection of the two VM lists in line 11 and this
result will be returned to the incremental verification module.
Example 4
We illustrate how pruning works for Example 3. We first check the policy“VMBob,*,
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Algorithm 2: Pruning
Input: Event, Policies, RadixTries
Output: PrunedList
1 for each Policy ∈ Policies do
2 if Policy.TenantID == Event.TenantID then
3 Add Policy.VMs to VMsUnderTenantPolicy
4 if VMsUnderTenantPolicy is not empty then
5 if event is a Routing event then
6 for each RouterInterface ∈ RadixTries.RouterInterfaces do
7 for each port ∈ RounterInterface do
8 Add get(VM) to VMsUnderEventScope
9 else
10 Add get(VM) to VMsUnderEventScope
11 PrunedList ← VMsUnderTenantPolicy∩VMsUnderEventScope
12 return PrunedList
Deny” to identify Bob’s VM as the only VM under the policy. Since attach port
event may affect reachability under the same subnet, which applies to Bob’s VM, the
pruning module intersects the two lists and generates a pruned list with only Bob’s
VM. As a result, instead of verifying all the eight pairs of reachability, the verification




In this chapter, firstly we detail implementation that distributes the operations of
VMGuard into three phases. Secondly we present experimentation, where we first
describe experimental settings and then present experiment results with both real
and synthetic data.
4.1 Implementation
We implement VMGuard based on OpenStack [52], a widely used open source cloud
management platform. Figure 7 illustrates the high-level architecture. There are
mainly three phases in VMGuard. First, the initialization phase is for pre-processing
the given policies and dependency models, which is conducted only once. At initiation,
the compliance verification for policies is performed to check that no violation had
already occurred before initialization of VMGuard. Second, the run-time phase is
for event-driven verification and is conducted with each successive event. Third, the
audit phase is to ensure the correctness of prediction and verification. An audit
is triggered periodically in background to identify implementation flaws that can
introduce errors in the accuracy of verification and improvises tenants’ dependency
20














































































Figure 7: The high-level architecture of VMGuard
4.1.1 Initialization Phase
Before initialization, the dependency model is generated for each tenant with the logs
collected from two OpenStack services, Nova (compute) and Neutron (network). The
raw service logs comprise of all tenants requests which are first parsed into column
format and then filtered sequentially for each tenant to obtain tenant’s logged requests
that are used to model the tenant’s cloud usage patterns. The processed logs are
fed into the Bayesian network tool, SMILE & GeNIe [8] in order to generate the
dependency model for each tenant. The configuration information that summarizes
virtual network infrastructure resides in Nova and Neutron databases. We fetch
these databases and process them to generate the radix tries [28], which facilitates
21
optimized searching using IP prefixes. The policies stated by both tenants (intra-
tenant) and cloud service provider (inter-tenant) are collected from databases and
inter-tenant policies are processed into intra-tenant format to aid the policy pruning
and verification process, as discussed in Chapter 5.1. Finally, an initial verification
is conducted to check the compliance of current cloud state against specified policies.














































































Figure 8: Flowchart of initialization phase
4.1.2 Run-Time Phase
The run-time phase is even-driven which is performed with each successive event to
ensure continuous compliance. Each Neutron and Nova even is intercepted from the
22
cloud pipeline using an audit middleware [13]. The middleware redirects the event
towards VMGuard that decides the compliance of event before it is actually executed
within the cloud pipeline. We leverage the TenantGuard’s [69] implementation, writ-
ten in Java [59]. Firstly, we add policy-based puring that shortlists policies affected
by events based on affected components of virtual infrastructure. We further utilized
the deep object copy mechanism [70] that helps creating an identical independent
copy of existing virtual infrastructure which can be used to apply events and perform
verification without affecting the original virtual infrastructure (referred as fork in
incremental verification). Multi-threading [60] is leveraged for parallel verification
(i.e., either pre-compute or intercept-check) where multiple events are verified trig-
gered from different tenants. An intercept-check verification for an event occurs at a
whitelist miss. Therefore, an intercept-check event requires immediate attention as
it leads to direct delays in event processing time. The intercept-check event threads
are executed with a higher thread priority that grants an event immediate process-
ing resources. The pre-computation for predicted events need to verify various events
with parameters. Therefore, the pre-computation might not complete before an event
is triggered by the tenant. So pre-computation threads are executed as background
processes with lower thread priority for freeing resources when idle. To aid the man-
agement of threads, we initialize them with corresponding tenant ID for whom the
verification is being performed. Only one thread will run for each tenant at any
moment, i.e., either a pre-computation or an intercept-check thread will exist for a













































































Figure 9: Flowchart of thread execution flow
4.1.3 Audit Phase
An audit phase devises implementation and prediction corrections for verification and
dependency model. An audit phase is performed periodically as a low priority thread
24
and ID as audit to distinguish it from run-time threads. For identifying implementa-
tion flaws a two step audit is performed. Firstly, sync-check verifies synchronization
of the virtual infrastructure. State derived incrementally is checked against the actual
state of cloud which resides in the service databases. Secondly, state-check verifies
policies against virtual infrastructure for their compliance. The interpretation of
sync-check and state check outcomes to identify implementation flaws is elaborated
in Chapter 5.1. Sync-check is done by graph comparison [68], using JGraphT [29],
a Java graph library, to verify nodes, edges and their connections within the states.
State-check uses a special incremental verification fork which takes input as both the
states and policies. Compliance check is performed and variation in states result im-
plies implementation flaws elaborated in Chapter 5.1. Audit phase also improvises
the prediction ability of VMGuard with log learner which learns over simultaneous
log trails. It collects Nova and Neutron logs from Ceilometer, the telemetry service in
OpenStack. The logs are parsed to column format for GeNIe to update the tenant’s
dependency model. A few other measures are adopted to enhance event dependencies
based on platform learning discussed in Chapter 5.1. Figure 10 illustrates the thread


































































































Figure 10: Flowchart of thread execution flow
4.2 Experiments
We perform all our experiments based on OpenStack [52], a widely used open source
cloud management platform. Firstly, we describe experimental settings and then
present experiment results with both real and synthetic data.
4.2.1 Experimental Settings
Our test cloud is an OpenStack release Mitaka with one controller node and 80 com-
pute nodes. Each node runs Ubuntu 16.04 server on an Intel i7 dual-core CPU with
2GB memory. The neutron network driver is ML2 OpenVSwitch with L3 agent plu-
gins, which is a popular networking deployment. We use the cloud schema presented
26
Dataset Tenants VMs Routers Subnets Policies per tenant
DS1 50 4,362 300 525 100
DS2 100 10,168 600 1,288 200
DS3 150 14,414 800 1,828 300
DS4 200 20,207 1,000 2,580 400
DS5 250 25,246 1,200 3,210 500
Table 2: Statistics of the datasets
in the recent OpenStack survey [55] as a basis for our simulation where we simulate
an environment with maximum 250 tenants and 25,000 VMs. We conduct the experi-
ment on five different datasets varying the number of tenants from 50 to 250, policies
per tenant from 100 to 500, subnets from 500 to 3,200, routers from 300 to 1,200,
while keeping the number of VMs fixed to 100 per tenant. We believe these data
sets represent a wide-range of cloud setups. Every experiment is performed over 100
iterations.
4.2.2 Performance of VMGuard
The Initialization Phase
We first compare the performance of our work with the state-of-art solution, Ten-
antGaurd [69] for the initialization phase. All the experiment results are gathered
from a single machine. Parallelization can still be applied to further improve the per-
formance, which is considered as future work. The first set of experiments compare
the time consumption for the initialization phase including data collection and initial
verification.
27
















Figure 11: The data collection time for VMGuard and TenantGuard in the initializa-
tion phase
Results and Implications for Initialization
In general, the one-time initialization phase takes longer than other phases. Due to
the extra policy processing module, compare to TenantGuard, VMGuard requires a
slightly longer time to finish data collection as shown in Figure 11. However, VM-
Guard performs much better in initialization verification. We observe that Tenant-
Guard’s initialization time increases exponentially with the size of the cloud, whereas
VMGuard shows negligible increase largely due to the pruning module which limits
the scope of the verification.
The Incremental Verification and Pruning
TenantGuard is originally designed to work on the static snapshot of the virtual
infrastructure [69]. Making TenantGuard incremental and suitable for an event-driven
application faces many implementation challenges (some of these are demonstrated in
Chapter 3.1). In implementing VMGuard, we have tackled those challenges and, by
disabling both the pruning and proactive modules of VMGuard, we basically obtain
28













Figure 12: The initialization time for VMGuard and TenantGuard in the initialization
phase
an incremental version of TenantGuard, which will be called VMGuard0 from now
on. Also, the VMGuard with only the proactive module disabled (which means it
has both the incremental and pruning modules) will be called VMGuard1. In the
second set of the experiments, we compare VMGuard0 (incremental) and VMGuard1
(incremental+pruning) with events selected from different hierarchical levels of the
virtual infrastructure. Figure 13, 14 and 15 correspond to VM-level, subnet-level,
and router-level events, respectively.
Results and Implications for Incremental Verification and Pruning
Both VMGuard0 and VMGuard1 perform verification within a promising time range
(0.4s to verify a high complexity event in the largest dataset) for different types of
events. We can observe that VMGuard1 takes significant less time than VMGuard0
in all cases, which clearly demonstrates the benefit of the pruning module. When
comparing between the three figures, we can see the time consumption for VMGuard0
and VMGuard1 is similar in both Figure 13 and Figure 14. This is because, although
29


















Figure 13: The performance of VMGuard0 (incremental) and VMGuard1 for VM level
events
attach security group rule and attach port are the events at two different levels, the
scope of these two events is similar (i.e., the VMs that directly correspond to the
security group rule or the port). Other updating/deletion/addition events at these
two levels are expected to share a similar trend. Also, as shown in Figure 15, delete
router requires significantly longer verification time, because the verification depends
on the number of subnets under the router and the number of VMs under each subnet;
the scope of the verification is therefore larger than with the previous two events (even
add router event would generate less verification overhead than delete router).
The Proactive Verification
The third set of the experiments evaluates the performance of the proactive module,
namely, VMGurad2 (the complete version of VMGuard with all modules enabled).
Since whether the proactive verification is triggered depends on the given threshold,
VMGuard1 can be considered as a special case of VMGuard2 by setting the threshold
as 1 (means no event can trigger the proactive module). In this experiment, we
use real data collected from a real world community cloud hosted at one of the
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Figure 14: The performance of VMGuard0 (incremental) and VMGuard1 subnet level
events
largest telecommunications vendors to obtain the dependency model and extract the
sequences of events.
Results and Implications for Proactive Verification
Figure 16 shows the verification time comparison between the intercept-check VMGuard1
and the proactive VMGuard2. The latter one requires significantly less, sometimes
negligible, verification time, which demonstrates the benefit of the proactive module.
The upper figure of figure 17 shows the run-time memory consumption of VMGuard2
under two different thresholds, as well as the results of VMGuard1 and VMGuard0.
The high memory consumption for VMGuard0 is mainly due to its need to maintain
a large number of pair-wise reachability. After the initialization phase, the memory
consumption stays nearly plateau because each successive event will only affect a
limited amount of reachability. Comparing VMGuard2 (under both threshold values)
to VMGuard1, the number of triggered pre-computations show a positive correlation
with memory consumption. During the idle time, VMGuard2
0.5 finishes the pre-
computation and shares the same memory consumption as VMGuard1; however, due
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Figure 16: The performance for VMGuard2 and VMGuard1 vs. Time
.
to the larger number of pre-computation candidate events, VMGuard2
0.1 still shows a
higher memory consumption during idle time to finish the ongoing pre-computation



































Figure 17: The performance for VMGuard2 and VMGuard1 vs. Memory (up) and
CPU (bottom)
Results and Implications for Scalability
As shown in Figure 17, the proactive module significantly reduces the performance
time of VMGuard. For evaluation purposes, we disable this module in the scalability
tests. Note that this configuration represents the worst case scenario.
Overall, we achieve promising results during scalability with different types of
event. In this experiment, we observe that the router event and router interface event
require more time during the verification. This is mainly because each event in router
or router interface level is associated with a larger number of pruned list VMs due
to the impacted VM list is larger than the event happen in a lower hierarchical level.
In VMGuard, the intercept check module verifies all the VMs in the pruned list,
which means the larger pruned list, the longer verification time; when the pruned list
stays the same, the verification time would be constant as well. As we discussed in
Section 3.5, the pruned list is directly associated with two lists, the number of VMs
under the policy and the number of VMs under the impact of the event. In Figure 18,
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Figure 18: Performance comparison by varying the # of VMs per subnet
the number of VMs under the policy stays the same, however, the impacted number
of VMs under router and router interface event increases with the number of VMs
per subnet. Therefore, we can observe the increase of time consumption for both
types of events. Different than Figure 19, only the impact of router event increases
with the number of subnet per router; we observe the increase of router event and a
constant trend for the other two events. In Figure 20, the number of VMs under the
policy increases since the number of policy per tenant increases. In other words, the
number of pruned list increases in all level of events; we observe the increase of time
consumption for all the events.
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Figure 19: Performance comparison by varying the # of subnet per router















Figure 20: Performance comparison by varying the # of policies per tenant
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Chapter 5
Discussions and Application to
NFV
In this chapter, firstly we discuss effect of wrong perdition, choice of threshold value,
correctness of input, policies supported by VMGuard and various cloud platform
portability. Secondly, we extend our solution for NFV environment proactively en-
forcing network isolation within VFN’s using state-based verification.
5.1 Discussions
5.1.1 The Effect of a Wrong Prediction
We distinguish our dependency models from LeaPS [41] and PVSC [40], as they pro-
pose common dependency model for all the tenants in an environment. For our case,
the dependency model for each tenant is distinct and represents the cloud operations
usage patterns of the tenant. VMGuard pre-computes verification for the predicted
event. If there is a wrong prediction resulted from the inaccuracy of tenants’ depen-
dency model, the pre-computed results are not useful and hence, VMGuard works
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as an intercept-check solution in such circumstances. To continuously improve the
prediction accuracy of the dependency model for each tenant, we periodically trigger
log learner that updates this model using the tenants cloud logs in the audit phase.
Cloud logs stores operations requested by all the tenants which are first segregated
for each tenant and then learning is performed to update tenants dependency models.
In addition, to be more accurate in the prediction, we incorporate structural depen-
dencies specific to the cloud platform with dependency model that adjusts prediction
probability for scenarios that cannot exist for the tenant (For example, In OpenStack
[52], a subnet cannot be deleted by the tenant before detaching all the created ports).
5.1.2 Choice of Threshold Values
In VMGuard, the amount of pre-computation effort is controlled through a threshold
value. The operations with prediction probability higher than or equal to the thresh-
old value are chosen as precomputation candidates. The verification is performed for
each candidate operation with all its possible variants. The lower value of thresh-
old results in a higher number of prediction candidates and vice versa. Therefore,
precomputation is simultaneously performed for all the tenants by VMGuard which
requires a careful estimation by the cloud service provider. The threshold provided
by the cloud provider can be decided based on the service level agreement (SLA) with
customers as well as based on the experiences of cloud service provider.
5.1.3 Correctness of VMGuard Inputs
The correctness of state-based verification performed by VMGuard relies on two fac-
tors. First, the correctness of extracting operation parameters from the cloud manage-
ment application interface which produces the events. Second, determining the event
which affects reachability. The occurrence of any error in the extraction of operation
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parameters will result in a deviation of incrementally produced state from the actual
state of the cloud. Missing reachability can add a delay in detection (an isolation
breach will still be detected but it will be retroactive). To overcome the aforemen-
tioned challenges to the correctness of verification, we perform synchronization and
state check. These checks are triggered periodically in the audit phase.
– In synchronization check, the incrementally obtained virtual infrastructure (state)
is checked against actual configuration (state) of the cloud. Both states (actual
state of the cloud and incrementally derived state) are organized as graphs. The
graph contains vertices as virtual components (e.g., router, interfaces, ports,
subnets, VM, etc.) and the edges connect the components. The vertices and
edges are cross-checked within both graphs. The failure in matching vertices and
edges implies the existence of an error which occurred during the extraction of
operation parameter from the management application interface. Further, the
vertex or an edge that does not match with the actual configuration indicates
the exact operation which was not correctly extracted.
– The state check is performed in addition to the synchronization check, only if
no error is found. In the previous step, we determine that the state obtained
incrementally is coherent with the actual cloud configurations. Now we verify
the compliance of all the network isolation policies over the state (can be any
state as both of them are coherent). A fork thread is assigned with a low
priority and the ID audit to distinguish the thread from precomputation and
intercept-check threads. The input to an audit fork is the state (from the
previous step) and all the network isolation policies. The failure of verification
implies misidentification of reachability affecting operation. The policy which
is violated can be used to trace back to the reachability operation that went
misidentified.
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5.1.4 Policies Supported by VMGuard
VMGuard is designed to verify policies related to virtual network isolation. As an
example, VMGuard supports the list of policies proposed in NoD [36]. The list of
security policies (defined by the cloud provider and/or its tenants) is an input to the
VMGuard system. These policies can vary in nature, such as inter-tenant (i.e., cross-
tenant reachability policy) specified only by the cloud service provider, and intra-
tenant (i.e., tenant scoped reachability policy) specified by tenants for themselves.
The format for specifying policy is as follow:
Intra-Tenant Policy={SRCVM,DSTVM,TID,Protocol,Action}
Inter-Tenant Policy={SRCVM,SRC TID,DSTVM,DST TID,Protocol,Action}
For the ease of pruning and verification, VMGuard processes an inter-tenant policy
into two intra-tenant policies where destination in each is replaced with the exter-
nal network of the corresponding tenant. Protocol in policy specifies both direction
(i.e., ingress and egress), port numbers (i.e., access control list parameters) for the
reachability. The action states whether the reachability amongst VMs should exist
or not.
5.1.5 Cross-Platform Portability
Cloud platforms are developed by various vendors such as Amazon EC2 [3], Google
GCP [25], Microsoft Azure [42] and VMware vCD [67] (i.e., the big four). Each vendor
has their own application interfaces and virtual infrastructure model. VMGuard
leverages the models from both TenantGuard [69] and LeaPS [41] and inherit their
interoperability amongst different cloud platforms. In TenantGuard [69], the virtual
infrastructure model comprises forwarding and filtering rules which are used with
different cloud platforms as per their vendor specification. The probability of a virtual
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infrastructure model is illustrated in Table 3. The inter-tenant, intra-tenant, and L3
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Table 3: Virtual infrastructure model portability under different cloud platforms [69]
Operation OpenStack [52] Amazon EC2-
VPC [3]
Google GCE [25] Microsoft Azure
[42]
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N/A az network nsg create






N/A az network nsg delete
Table 4: An excerpt of mapping operation application interfaces of different cloud
platforms [41]
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Similarly, each vendor-specific cloud platform uses different nomenclature for their
management application interfaces. LeaPS [41] presents the analogy in nomenclature
used with various cloud platforms in contrast to OpenStack [52] as illustrated in
Table 4. Hence, the interoperability of VMGuard among different vendor-specific
cloud platforms can be easily derived from the interoperability of its two ancestors,
i.e., TenantGuard [69] and LeaPS [41].
5.2 Application to NFV
5.2.1 Introduction
The telecommunication industry has increased over-subscribed usage of their core
networks each successive year as it faces rapid increase in the consumer base with an
exploding number of devices that need to communicate (e.g., Internet of things [34]),
which increases the demand for data exchange, requiring a higher bandwidth to oper-
ate. According to a Cisco forecast, the global mobile data traffic is expected to reach
approximately 31 Exabytes per month by 2020, i.e., roughly a seven-time increase
since 2017 [12]. To cope up with market demands, the telecoms are often forced
to substantially increase both CAPEX (Capital Expenditures) and OPEX (Operat-
ing Expenditures) for upgrading their physical network infrastructure. Traditionally,
a network service (NS) deployed by telecoms required specialized networking hard-
ware (known as middle-boxes or network appliances) that are vital components to
operate core networks [11]. The expansion and upgrade of network services faced
enormous challenges such as equipment compatibility, space to accommodate new
equipment and manual efforts required to deploy and manage new network services.
The aforementioned challenges of the telecom network operators to incorporate net-
work expansions and deliver reliable services with a high bandwidth brings about
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a new line of solution with ETSI NFV [18, 19]. With seven of the world’s lead-
ing telecoms network operators, European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI; The world standardization organization for telecommunications) is the home
of industry specification group for Network Function Virtualization (NFV). NFV de-
vises virtualization (Clouds) to decouple hardware from the software for a network
functions to be deployed as a Virtual Network Function (VNF) over the Commercial
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) servers.
Virtualization moves traditional data centers into the Clouds, making them re-
source efficient through multi-tenancy that relies on a virtualized pool of resources
to reduce computation cost, aid flexibility, and provide metered services. To that
end, NFV is an evolution of clouds and therefore shares its attack surface. Yet till
date, from Berkeley’s view of clouds, the lack of visibility into underlying infrastruc-
ture limits auditability in the cloud which makes it as one of the top ten security
concerns [7]. Therefore, there is a need for auditing NFV to enhance the guarantee
of stakeholders with transparency and accountability as illustrated in the motivating
example below:
Motivating Example: Recall the attack scenario presented in Chapter 1 , con-
sider that Alice and Bob are now considered as tenants with an NFV service provider,
who is running the orchestration platform by leasing infrastructure resources from a







































Figure 21: The NFV motivating example
Figure 21 illustrates a series of events triggered by the NFV clients Alice and Bob.
With event E1, Bob initiated a VNF having the security group which forbids SSH
Ingres and Egress traffic to the VNF. Unaware of an existing vulnerability in the
underlying VIM ( i.e. Cloud; discussed in a section later), Bob found himself to be
secure. Alice initiated a VNF with event EK−1 and update the VNF to attach with
the management network (subnet) of Bob, with event EK . This created an isolation
breach between Alice and Bob, which made Bob’s VNF reachable to Alice’s VNF. To
that end, we can observe that the NFV environment resides on clouds and therefore
shares a common attack surface which makes it subject to network isolation breaches.
Hence, we extent our cloud-based solution VMGuard to target an NFV environment
to enhance network isolation guarantee delivered by NFV. VMGuard extends its ap-




This section reviews NFV reference architecture with a focus on the role of cloud in
NFV. Later we review the interaction between cloud and NFV to orchestrate and
manage network services. Finally, we present an enhanced threat model associated
with the application to NFV.
NFV Reference Architecture
Figure 22 illustrates the high-level reference architecture defined by ETSI as the
guidelines to NFV. [19]. Also, know as MANO (management and orchestration ar-
chitecture); it has three major components identified as the driving unit for NFV,
which aid automation, orchestration and management of the network services. The
three components are detailed as follows.
– Network Function Virtualization Orchestrator (NFVO)
NFVO acts as a management interface, where the client specifies their network
service requirements. Commonly known as OSS/BSS (Business/Operations
Support System), it supports end-to-end telecommunication services require-
ment gathering which is encoded as the descriptors [71]. A descriptor can be
coded with different specification standards, out of which the most widely ac-
cepted descriptor standard is TOSCA [44] [20].The templates are on-boarded
and stored as catalogs. A client can choose an already existing catalog or can
onboard a customized network services descriptor based on their specific re-
quirements. NFVO orchestrates VNFs on the underlying cloud infrastructure



























































Figure 22: ETSI NFV architecture
– Virtual Network Function Manager (VNFM)
A VNFM manages the life-cycle for the VNFs. A VNF may exhibit opera-
tions such as query, scale, heal, subscribe, terminate, notify, etc. as a part of
the life-cycle, which are common to all the VNFs (know as health monitoring).
VNFM also coordinates with the EMS (Element Management Systems). An
EMS is specific life-cycle manager for a VNF, which requires mission-critical
health operations. An EMS is provided by vendors to assist health-checks from
their VNFs requirements [21].
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– Virtual Infrastructure Manager (VIM)
VIM manages and controls Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure (NFVI)
i.e., the pool of virtualized compute, storage and network resources. The phys-
ical servers are combined in order to act as a common pool of resources, which
are then logically redistributed. The resource pool can be driven either in pres-
ence of hypervisor, i.e. Virtualization, or in absence of it, i.e. Containerization.
Virtualization runs guest OS on the host OS which is completely isolated. Con-
tainerization runs guest containers that are packaged container specific utilities
and uses the common utility from host OS, which makes containers partially
isolated from host. [17]. Figure 23 illustrates the architectural view of virtual-
ization and containerization. The open source platforms for virtualization based
VIM is OpenStack [52] and containerization based VIM is Kubernetes [14]. Note
that, VMGuard is designed to work with the cloud environment, therefore, In
our use-case, we only cover virtualization based VIM i.e., OpenStack.
Figure 23: Virtualization vs Containerization
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Deploying a Network Service
TOSCA
OASIS standardizes descriptors as the means to encode interoperable services and
applications for enterprise workloads hosted on the cloud [43]. TOSCA, in particular,
enables interoperability and portability with automated management across the cloud
regardless of an underlying platform or infrastructure [44]. OASIS drafts descriptor
specification for NFV using which a network service can be created, managed and up-
dated (scaling, alarming, downgrading, etc.) [45]. The descriptors are of three types
based on the targeted part of a network service.
- Virtual Network Function Descriptor (VNFD)
VNFD describes the specification of a VNF. A VNF comprises of virtual de-
ployment units (VDUs) as the main component. A VDU corresponds to the
virtual machine and its specifications for running VNF software on it. The con-
nection points (CP) corresponds to the ports that attach VDUs to the network.
The virtual links (VL) corresponds to the routing rules connecting a network to
the router. The floating IPs (FIP) corresponds to the public IPs that connect
VDUs to the Internet. Figure 24(left) excerpt a sample VNF descriptor.
- VNF Forwarding Graph Descriptor (VNFFGD)
VNFFGD describes the forwarding paths which connects the VNFs. The for-
warding graphs require neutron-SFC (service function chaining) [57], which we
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do not support with current VMGuard. It can be included in the future with
upgrades in the verification algorithm.
- Network Service Descriptor (NSD)
NSD describes the complete end-to-end network service which is composed by






































































































































































































Figure 24: VNFD Sample TOSCA Descriptor
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HOT
Heat [47] is an OpenStack [52] orchestration engine, which implements a service
that enables the tenants to automate launching of multiple composite cloud applica-
tions that are written as HOT(Heat Orchestration Template) [48]. The templates are
human and machine accessible codes written in YAML which manages the entire life-
cycle of infrastructure and applications within the cloud. Figure 24 (right) presents
an excerpt of a heat orchestration template.
Deploying a network service
The NFV tenants (Bob and Alice in the motivating example) can either choose
from an on-boarded VNFD catalog or can upload a customized VNF descriptor based
on their requirements. The NFV provider hosts NFVO that facilitates the platform
for NFV clients. An NFV tenant initiates VNF by choosing the corresponding catalog,
VIM and NFVO orchestrate the descriptor definitions in a chosen VIM. The VNF
descriptors specified using TOSCA specification is provided by the NFV tenant as
illustrated in Figure 24. The NFVO parses template with TOSCA-Parser [58], which
converts it to a heat orchestration template (HOT). The heat template is provided
to OpenStack (VIM) for orchestrating the network service in the cloud. The heat
orchestration template defines a workflow for the cloud. The workflow is then executed
and NFVO is acknowledged for successful orchestration.
Threat Model
We adopt a thread model targeting threats such as implementation flaws, misconfig-
uration, and vulnerabilities in the cloud platform which a malicious cloud user may
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exploit in-order to violate the network isolation policies specified by cloud tenants
or the provider. We assume data (e.g., logs and configuration databases) from cloud
platform are intact and any attack prior to the current state of cloud which is not
reflected in the input data is out of scope. Any potential privacy leakage from the
verification results is out of the scope. Additionally, the change in policy is subjected
to an action triggered only by an orchestrator or the cloud provider. An NFV client
can only choose from recommended policies and may not have direct interaction to
devise their custom policies. Lastly, the scope of verification is strictly restricted to
be inside the VIM. Any service that stretches over more than one VIM is subjected
to verification within their corresponding VIMs.









































Figure 25: Applying Network Isolation Policies with VMGuard
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Figure 25 shows how VMGuard interacts with NFV. The tenants deploy VNFs which
are stored as TOSCA and converted to heat template as elaborated before. The
HOT is passed to VIM (i.e., OpenStack), which uses heat-parser and heat-engine to
deploy the template. VMGuard resides at VIM coordinates with the heat database
to extract VNF definition to recommend network isolation policies.
In Algorithm 3, line 1 is to extract resources requested by heat which is currently
in YAML format. Lines 2-4, shows queries to collect the requested network resources
(virtual machines, ports, security group rules, routing interfaces, and router). A
state fork in line 5 and all pair reachability in-scope of tenant is derived in line 6.
Reachability is identified in lines 8-11, based on which policies are produced with
corresponding actions. Line 12 returns the policies applicable to network isolation
within the tenant. The tenant can now present isolation policies to VNF owners to
proactively audit their VNFs with state-based verification.
Algorithm 3: Policy Processing
Input: Heat Orchestration Template
Output: Policies
1 Resources = ParseYAML(HOT)
2 for each Resource ∈ Resources do
3 if Resource.Type == (Server/Subnet/Port/Router/Interface/Security
Group) then
4 NetwrokResource=Resource;
5 Graph = Fork(NetworkResource);
6 Reachability = IntraTenantAllPair(Graph);
7 for each Result ∈ Reachability do








We extend our testbed further to add NFV platform. With the existing OpenStack
environment, we add OpenStack Heat [47] project that executes the workflow. We
develop an NFV platform with OpenStack MANO project Tacker [61] and its pre-
requisites Keystone [54], Barbican [46] and Mistral [50]. Further, we modify policy
processing methodology with VMGuard to support automated policy recommenda-
tion for the NFV tenants.
Proof-Of-Concept
We integrate VMGuard with ERDC (Audit Ready Cloud platform), elaborated in
section 7.5. VMGuard addresses the limitations of existing proactive and retroactive
solutions with state-based proactive verification and enforcement. Figure 26 shows
the VMGuard graphical interface. In Figure 26 (top), we can see the initiation button
for VMGuard which performs processes prerequisites such as dependency model for
tenants. Once done, it asks for policy specification mode, where the automatic mode
is to extract heat policies for NFV users and manual mode for cloud tenants. On
receiving the auditing of auditing policies, VMGuard is initiated.
In Figure 26 (bottom), we show alert board for VMGuard which indicates isolation
breach violations. Each violation is presented with details such as tenant involved,
policy violated, detection mode (i.e., proactive or intercept-check). Further, a viola-
tion prevented by VMGuard can be viewed with the state-based effect (reachability)
which it would have exerted if the violating event had been executed.
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VMGuard integrates the best of both state-based verification and proactive ap-
proaches. Firstly, we review existing solutions which verify network isolation in the
non-cloud or cloud environments. Secondly, we review the solutions with proactive
abilities for non-cloud and cloud environments. Finally, we compare the collection of
cloud-based solutions with VMGuard to showcase the advantages that our solution
possesses.
6.1 Network Isolation Verification
Table 5 shows existing works for network isolation (i.e., State-Based) verification solu-
tions.] The first column classifies existing works based on targeted environments, i.e.,
either cloud (virtual networks) or non-cloud (traditional networks). The second and
third columns list existing works and indicate their verification methods, respectively.
The next column compares those works based on various features, e.g., the support
of parallel implementation, incremental verification, NAT, and all pairs reachability
verification. The next two columns respectively compare the scope of those works,
i.e., whether the work is designed for physical or virtual networks, and whether it
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addresses control or data plane in such networks.
There exist several works (e.g., [32, 31, 39, 33, 72, 73, 24, 22, 23]) that tar-
get non-cloud networks (i.e., either traditional network or SDN). Works such as
[32, 39, 73, 24, 22, 23] cover physical network . Most of these works face issues in
scalability for the cloud environment. Other existing works [31, 33, 72, 9, 65, 38, 69],
like VMGuard, covers virtual networks and can scale to the large scale cloud envi-
ronments. Networking functionality is divided into planes where traffic steering is
managed by the control plane and the data plane is responsible for traffic forwarding.
Existing works such as [24, 22, 23, 65] focus on the control plane whereas VM-
Guard, TenantGuard [69] and [32, 31, 39, 33, 72, 73, 36, 64] are developed for the
data plane. Based on the features incorporated by existing works, only VMGuard,
TenantGuard [69], Libra [73], Anteater [39] and NetPlumer [31] can leverage parallel
processing. VMGuard can parallelize state of virtual infrastructure to verify events
simultaneously whereas TenantGuard [69] uses parallel processing for in-memory stor-
age. The incremental verification helps to cope with the dynamicity of the network.
Existing works such as [31, 72, 73, 33], TenantGuard [69] and VMGuard can operate
incrementally. TenantGuard [69] proposes incremental verification but does not eval-
uate it. VMGuard enhances the proposed methodology by TenantGuard [69] with
pruning and evaluates the technique. Network address translation used for public IP
in the cloud is only covered in [32, 31, 39, 72, 73, 36, 64], TenantGuard [69] and
VMGuard. Existing works such as [31, 23, 36, 64] and TenantGuard [69] target
cloud-wide reachability which is different from VMGuard as it performs verification




Phys. Virt. Control Data Paral. Incr. NAT All Pairs Reach.
Hassel [32] Custom algorithms X X X
NetPlumber [31] Graph-theoretic X X X X X X
Anteater [39] SMT Solver X X X X
Veriflow [33] Graph-theoretic X X X
Non-Cloud AP verifier [72] Custom algorithms X X X X
Libra [73] Graph-theoretic X X X X X
ARC [24] Graph-theoretic X X
ERA [22] Custom algorithms X X
Batfish [23] SMT Solver X X X
NoD [36] SMT Solver X X X X
Plotkin et al. [64] SMT Solver X X X X
Cloud Radar [9] Graph-theoretic X
Cloud Probst et al. [65] Graph-theoretic X X
Madi et al. [38] CSP Solver X X
TenantGuard [69] Custom algorithms X X X X X X
VMGuard Custom algorithms X X X X X
Table 5: Comparing network isolation solutions with VMGuard
6.2 Proactive Verification
Table 6 summarizes proactive solutions for cloud and non-cloud environments. The
first and second columns enlist existing works and their verification methods. The
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next column compares the coverage such as supported environment (cloud or non-
cloud) and cloud layers (virtual infrastructure and/or user-level). ’Both’ means the
work supports both virtual infrastructure and user-level cloud layers. The next six
columns compare these works according to different features, i.e., proactiveness, auto-
mated and dynamic dependency capturing, cloud-platform-agnostic and probabilistic
dependencies.
Solutions such as Jiang et al. [30], Ligatti et al. [35] are for non-cloud environment
whereas PVSC [40], Weatherman [10], Congress [53], LeaPS [41], Patron [37] and
VMGuard works with cloud environment. Only VMGuard and Jiang et al. [30] work
in an automatic mode. VMGuard facilitates automatic policy extraction from heat
templates. VMGuard inherits the probabilistic model of LeaPS [41]. Others [30], [40]
and [37] also employ probability based dependency model. VMGuard and Patron [37]
are the only self-reliant works; VMGuard relies on its audit phase for the correction
of implementation flaws which may pose a threat to its accuracy. Congress [53] and
Ligatti et al. [35] are the only works with policy expressiveness as all other works have
customized policies. Ligatti et al. [35] and Weatherman [10] can support dynamic
modeling, whereas for VMGuard the model remains fixed, yet they are interoperable
(manual effort required) with different cloud platforms.
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Platform Proposal Methods Coverage
Features
Proactive Automatic Dynamic Probabilistic Expressive Self-Reliant
Non-Cloud Jiang et al. [30] Regression Technique N/A X X - X - X
Ligatti et al. [35] Model Checking N/A X N/A X - X X
PVSC [40] Custom Algorithm Both X - - X - -
Weatherman [10] Graph-theoretic Virtual Infr. X - X - - -
Cloud Congress [53] Datalog Both X - - - X -
LeaPS [41] Custom + Bayesian Both X - - X -
Patron [37] Custom Algorithm User-level X - - X - X
VMGuard Custom Algorithm Virtual Infr. X X - X - X
Table 6: Comparing proactive solutions with VMGuard
6.3 State-Based Proactive Verification
Table 7 summarizes the comparison between existing works on state-based proactive
verification and VMGuard. The first and second columns enlist existing works and
their verification methods, respectively. The next eight columns compare these works
according to different features, i.e., retroactive, intercept-check (I-C), proactive, in-
cremental (Incr.), parallel workload distribution (Paral.), pruning-based verification,
and multi-threading to manage multiple requests (M-Thread). The last two columns
compare the scope of network isolation works, i.e., virtual networks (Vir. Net.), and
data plane (D. Plane) in such networks. The main benefit of VMGuard over those
works is that VMGuard provides a real-time response while verifying virtual network
isolation in the data plane. To that end, VMGuard’s unique combination of features
is: proactive, incremental and pruning.
There exist several works (e.g., [36, 64, 31, 69]) for virtual network isolation ver-
ification. Among them, NoD [36], Plotkin et al. [64] and TenantGuard [69] adopt a
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retroactive approach, which detects an isolation breach after the fact. Specifically,
NoD [36], is a logic-based verification engine that checks reachability policies using
Datalog. Plotkin et al. [64] leverage the regularities existing in data centers to lessen
the verification overhead using bi-simulation and modal logic. However, both of these
works may cause hours to days of delay in verifying reachability. Whereas, Tenant-
Guard [69] achieves verification time of 18 minutes for the same dataset by performing
a hierarchical verification approach. However, for policy verification, TenantGuard
relies on Congress [53], which causes a significant delay (as discussed in Chapter 2).
Unlike these works, VMGuard achieves a practical response time (e.g., in a few mil-
liseconds), as reported in Chapter 4.2 by adopting a proactive approach. There exist
some other works (e.g., [31, 33, 32, 24, 23, 73]) for SDN-based or traditional networks.
Among them, NetPlumber [31] leverages verifying hypotheses before deploying, but it
is only applicable to SDN-based networks. In contrast, VMGuard verifies hypothesis
in the virtual network environment for clouds.
There exist some proactive verification solutions (e.g., [53, 10, 41, 40]) for clouds.
Weatherman [10] performs proactive verification on the virtual infrastructure based
on the future change plan. Similarly, Congress [53] performs proactive verification
over the proposed hypothetical configuration for the cloud. Both of those works rely
on manual identification of future plan, and otherwise, cause a significant delay as
an intercept-and-check solution. Whereas, VMGuard adopts an automated proactive
approach (based on dependency model), and achieves a response time of a few mil-
liseconds. Similar to VMGuard, PVSC [40] and LeaPS [41] achieve the response time
in milliseconds. However, those works rely on signatures and cannot detect many
isolation breaches (as demonstrated in Chapter 3). To that end, VMGuard adopts a





















































































































































































































































































































During this master thesis study, other than VMGuard, which is the main contribution
of this master thesis project, we also contributed to other projects that are described
in the following sections.
7.1 ProSAS: Proactive Security Auditing Sys-
tem for Clouds through Caching and Pre-
Computation
The dynamic nature due to self-service in clouds calls for run-time auditing to ensure
continuous security compliance. However, the existing auditing approaches, intercept-
and-check and proactive ones, fail to provide a practical response time due to the sheer
size and multi-tenancy in most of the cloud environments. ProSAS is a proactive se-
curity auditing system, which reduces the response time and significantly improves
the efficiency over the existing auditing approaches. The main idea is to perform
costly verification proactively (ahead of time) to reduce run-time delay. ProSAS
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builds a dependency model leveraging the relationship between cloud events to trig-
ger pre-computation, and performs verification at the occurrence of the critical event.
ProSAS further employs caching techniques to improve the efficiency of search against
the stored pre-computation results.
Our contribution to this work are listed in the following.
– Implemented a cloud environment by utilizing OpenStack [52] version Mitika.
In our environment, a controller and compute nodes are implemented to col-
lect input for ProSAS. The connecting technology between different nodes is
LinuxBridge.
– Implemented and evaluated the caching mechanisms using LRU (Lease Recent
Used) and MRU (Most Recent Used), which improved the hit rate of values
searched.
ProSAS is an extension of [40] and is currently under revision for the IEEE Trans-
actions on Dependable and Secure Computing journal.
7.2 ProxiMet: Security Metrics for Evaluating
and Mitigating Co-residency Threats in Public
Cloud
Multi-tenancy in cloud benefits the resource optimization but also lead to several se-
curity concerns such as co-residency of tenant’s virtual infrastructures, including VMs
and virtual networks. The nature of co-residency demands a quantitative approach for
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measuring the relative distance between cloud resources, which is currently missing
in most existing works. ProxiMet is a quantitative approach to security compliance
auditing which devises security metrics to define a distance-based co-residency level
of tenant’s virtual infrastructures.
Our contribution to this work are listed in the following.
– Implemented a simulator that simulated the cloud environment to distribute
virtual resource. Further, implemented the suite of security metrics which cal-
culated the distance of co-residency for a virtual resource in the environment.
– Evaluated the security metrics for two real cloud data sets. The first data set
was from one of the largest telecommunication service provider and the second
from Google public cloud.
ProxiMet is currently under revision for the IEEE Transactions on Dependable
and Secure Computing journal.
7.3 TenantGuard+: Efficient Cloud Network Pol-
icy Verification at Runtime using Formal
Methods
In this work, we audit the compliance of high-level policies specified by the network
operators or by the cloud tenants, using a twofold approach. First, we used state of
the art network verification tool TenantGuard, to model the network behavior and
extract information about the relationship between different components in the vir-
tualized network, such as which VM is reachable from which others, the flow path
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information such as, the path length from the source to the destination. Second, we
leverage the results provided by the network verification tool to verify the compliance
of the networking configuration against predefined high-level policies. We formalize
the network policy as CSP (Constraint Satisfaction Problems), for a constraint solver,
namely Sugar [66], to validate the compliance.
Our contribution to this work is listed in the following.
– Performed data collection from TenantGuard [69] for different data sets, col-
lecting all pair reachability paths.
– Installed an SAT solver, implemented data pre-processing, parsing and data
mapping scripts. Evaluated CSP files for 100 iterations executed under SAT
solver to obtain timing results.
TenantGuard+ is a paper in preparation for submission to a journal.
7.4 Modeling NFV Deployment to Identify the
Cross-level Inconsistency Vulnerabilities
By providing network functions through software running on standard hardware, Net-
work Functions Virtualization (NFV) brings many benefits, such as increased agility
and flexibility with reduced costs, as well as additional security concerns. Although
existing works have examined various security issues of NFV, such as vulnerabilities
in VNF software and DoS, there has been little effort on a security issue that is in-
trinsic to NFV, i.e., as an NFV environment typically involves multiple abstraction
levels, the inconsistency that may arise between different levels can potentially be
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exploited for security attacks. In this paper, we propose the first NFV deployment
model to capture the deployment aspects of NFV at different abstraction levels, which
is essential for an in-depth study of the inconsistencies between such levels. Based on
the model and an implemented NFV testbed, we present concrete attack scenarios in
which the inconsistencies are exploited to attack the network functions in a stealthy
manner. Finally, we study the feasibility of detecting the inconsistencies through
verification.
Our contribution to this work is listed in the following.
– Assisted in designing deployment model to capture the deployment aspects of
NFV at different abstraction levels.
– Assisted with other editorial efforts for publication.
This paper is currently submitted to CloudCom19.
7.5 ERDC: Ericsson Research Demo Cloud
We have played a major role in developing ERDC which is a proof of concept plat-
form for research works developed at Audit Ready Cloud (ARC) project [5]. The
platform integrates all major auditing approaches at different cloud layers. Figure 27
presents a reference architecture integrating our state-of-art research solutions. Up-
coming modules are planned proof-of-concept to be integrated in future, and only
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Figure 27: ARC tools integration reference architecture
The Platform: The platform runs in a virtual machine deployed within Eric-
sson research cloud. The machines is a headless server and is virtualized using vir-
tualbox [62] and managed by phpvirtualbox client [6]. We run a controller node and
four compute nodes to host infrastructure as a service cloud service deployed using
open source cloud platform OpenStack [52]. We use OpenStack version Mitika with
network communicating mechanism ML2 with OpenvSwitch, which is most used real
cloud configuration [55]. The machines inside are reachable via Apache HTTP proxy
where URL/horizon 1 serves OpenStack Horizon (cloud management dashboard) [49]
and URL/arc connects to ARC auditing dashboard. Dashboard provides a detailed
view of the cloud environment services and status with alert warning mechanisms.
It centralizes the control for all the auditing tools using which an auditor can make
on-demand requests and analyze results from each tool. We use HTML, CSS. JS,
1The URL to connect demo machine is a public IP address and is disclosed for Ericsson’s internal
use.
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Bootstrap, and Angular for front-end and back-end in PHP. Currently, ERDC com-
prises of following tools integrated:
• Layer 2 Verification: The cloud layer two is being audited with ISOTOP [38],
which uses flow rules from virtual switches of compute nodes to detect inter-
tenant and intra-tenant breaches.
• Layer 3 Verification: The cloud management layer is audited using Tenant-
Guard [69], which verifies all pair reachability amongst virtual machines.
• Proactive Verification: Existing solutions were after the fact detection where
proactive verification precomputes in-advance for the critical event to prevent
violation.
• Multi-tenant Co-residency: The suite of co-residency matrices Proximet
determine proximity between tenants sharing an environment.
• Log Anonymization: Sharing of cloud logs is made easier by SegGuard which
prevents privacy, preserving the utility of logs for third-party auditing.
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Figure 28: Cloud management using OpenStack Horizon and Audit Ready Cloud
dashboard covering complete cloud environment
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Figure 29: Layer 2 Auditing using Isotop [38]
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Figure 30: Layer 3 Auditing using TenantGuard [69]
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Figure 31: Proactive Auditing using LeaPS [41]
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Figure 32: Security Metrics for Co-residency Evaluation using ProxiMet
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Figure 33: Log Anonymization using SegPriv
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Chapter 8
Future Work and Conclusion
8.1 Future Work
As future work, firstly, we further plan to investigate the feasibility of integrating
a formal policy specification language with our solution to enhance its policy sup-
port. Secondly, we plan to recommend policies based on type of virtual machine
with deployed network function (i.e., firewall, IDS, etc.). Lastly, we see scope of pol-
icy optimization by prioritization and minimization of policies applied by VMGuard,
which is currently not the case. We also see future in carrying forward our verification
methodology to other cloud components (such as storage, identity management, etc.)
8.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, we addressed two major issues (e.g., inefficiency and inaccuracy) in the
existing virtual network isolation verification approaches, and proposed VMGuard,
which is a state-based proactive approach to efficiently verify network isolation poli-
cies in a large scale virtual infrastructure. To achieve better efficiency, VMGuard
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proactively conducted the verification of future events. On the other hand, to en-
sure the effectiveness, VMGuard simulated all possible impacts on the current state
and verified all those simulated states. Furthermore, we integrated VMGuard with
OpenStack, and evaluated its performance and efficiency through extensive experi-
ments using both real and synthetic data. We extended our solution to the network
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